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Abstract In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein 
defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According 
to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essen-
tially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable 
to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in 
Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of 
important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue 
for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and 
some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My 
main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that 
the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in oppo-
sition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.
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1. Introduction 
Wittgenstein’s later comments on meaning as use, with their emphasis 
on the significance of social practices, activities, circumstances, con-
texts, occasions of use etc., are sometimes taken to lend support for 
some form of semantic externalism. Thus, it is argued for instance, that 
Wittgenstein’s contextualism about meaning entails semantic exter-
nalism, and that his views on meaning and grammar are perfectly con-
sistent with Putnam’s version of externalism (see Child 2010; Putnam 
forthcoming). This is understandable given that Wittgenstein strongly 
criticised mentalist accounts of meaning, which are typically of an in-
ternalist bent. 
That said, however, in this paper I want to focus on those aspects of the 
later Wittgenstein’s arguments regarding meaning and grammar, which 
are aimed directly against certain core externalist ideas; e.g. the idea 
that the meaning of a word is the object to which the word refers, and 
so that the objects to which words refer should play a key role in seman-
tic explanations. 
My aim here is to show that there are important connections between 
Wittgenstein’s arguments against externalism and certain contemporary 
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arguments for semantic internalism, where the latter are aimed at deny-
ing the kinds of metaphysical commitments brought about by an out-
look I shall refer to as mentalist referentialism. I shall argue that drawing 
such a connection puts us in a position to maintain a strong opposition 
to a certain form of mentalism without having to adopt standard exter-
nalist commitments. 
The main focus on this paper will be on a particular post-Tractatus ar-
gument for the autonomy of grammar. The idea is that the grammar of 
language, and in particular linguistic meaning, is constituted indepen-
dently of metaphysical considerations concerning the nature of things 
that words are used to refer to. According to some commentators, the 
argument regarding the autonomous grammar forms part of Wittgen-
stein’s critical response to the treatment of grammar in the Tractatus.1 
For the purpose of this paper I will stay neutral as to whether the argu-
ment is aimed at the Tractatus or not; I shall assume that the target is a 
certain generic form of externalism regardless of whether this is the po-
sition Wittgenstein adopted in the Tractatus.2 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces and of-
fers an analysis of the later Wittgenstein’s argument for the autonomy 
of grammar. To prepare the ground for a comparison with semantic in-
ternalism in later sections of the essay, I shall distinguish what I under-
stand to be the main critical import of Wittgenstein’s argument from 
his constructive response to it. As we shall see, despite it motivating 
a number of new positive assumptions about meaning, the argument 
is still fundamentally negative. Section 3 turns to a contemporary de-
bate concerning the role that external objects play in the determina-
tion and explanation of linguistic meaning. I explain and distinguish 
two different brands of semantic internalism according to which mean-
ings are internally individuated and found ‘in the head’. I argue that 
there are some striking similarities between Wittgenstein and meth-
odological internalists, especially vis-à-vis their rejection of the refer-
entialist theory of meaning. Section 4 then examines Wittgenstein’s 
1  Peter Hacker is the most prominent representative of this view. See e.g. Hacker 
2000.
2  To be sure, there are some important indications that the Tractatus is indeed com-
mitted to externalist semantics. For instance, the analysis of nonsensical sentences 
makes reference to non-existing properties: “The reason why ‘Socrates is identical’ 
means nothing”, Wittgenstein maintains, “is that there is no property called ‘identi-
cal’” (TLP 5.473). And even more patently, objects that constitute states of affairs in 
the world are considered to be meanings (semantic or referential values) of lexical 
items (TLP 3.203). 
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anti-referentialism and his use conception of meaning in more detail. 
In section 5, I critically discuss several notions all of which represent 
Wittgenstein’s attempt to constructively respond to the autonomy argu-
ment: the conventionality of meaning, the arbitrariness thesis, and the 
role of nature in the determination of meaning. Although these, on the 
face of it, seem to be inconsistent with semantic internalism, a closer 
scrutiny reveals that these notions do not seem to carry a lot of weight 
in Wittgenstein’s account of grammar and meaning. Section 6 considers 
and rejects two additional problems for drawing the parallel with inter-
nalism: Wittgenstein’s contextualism and his opposition to the mental-
ist account of meaning. Finally, section 7 concludes the discussion and 
briefly lists several remaining points of disagreement between the later 
Wittgenstein and methodological internalists. 
2. The autonomy of grammar
In analysing Wittgenstein’s argument for the autonomy of grammar it is 
helpful to differentiate its main critical import from Wittgenstein’s con-
structive responses to the argument. As a critical reaction against the 
externalist construal of semantics by reference to the nature of things, 
the argument aims to show what does not figure in the determination 
of semantic facts. Its main purpose is to convince us that grammar (se-
mantics) doesn’t have any external source of determination but is, in-
stead, “self-contained and autonomous”.3 
Wittgenstein’s argument against the world-dependent grammar turns 
on the idea that grammatical rules cannot be justified as correct by ref-
erence to the nature of the things represented. This is because, as part of 
justification, we would need to mention how things are, or how things 
are not, and “any such description already presupposes the grammati-
cal rules” (PR 9). Wittgenstein expresses the same point by saying that 
“[one] cannot use language to get outside language” (PR 54). There are 
different variants of the argument for autonomy that attempt to show 
that the justification of grammatical rules is futile.4 
We may have certain reservations about this particular argumentative 
strategy, but the conclusion Wittgenstein reaches is important for pre-
sent purposes; namely that, in contrast to what the externalist would 
3  “The connection between “language and reality” is made by definitions of words, 
and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autono-
mous.” (Wittgenstein 1974: 55) 
4  For the discussion see Hacker 2000, 74ff.
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maintain, the grammar of language – i.e. the rules that assign meanings 
to words and regulate how words are put together to form meaningful 
sentences – is independent, and not answerable to the nature of exter-
nal objects and their combinatorial properties. In Wittgenstein’s words, 
“grammar is not accountable to any reality” (Wittgenstein 1974: 184; also 
2005: 184). However, once grammar is shown to be autonomous, there 
are some more positive suggestions as to what constitutes linguistic 
meaning. First of all, Wittgenstein would now characterise the nature 
of linguistic meaning as arbitrary rather than answerable to something 
extra-linguistic. He writes, “[grammatical rules] are not answerable to 
any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary” (Wittgenstein 1974: 184; 
also 2005: 184). Another positive suggestion concerns the way in which 
meaning is determined and explained once the idea that the external 
objects play this role is rejected. It consists in the notion that grammar 
and grammatical rules are constitutive of meaning.5 Grammatical rules 
are characterised as conventions6, and grammar is taken to consist of 
conventions (Wittgenstein 1974: 190). 
Wittgenstein does not discuss the idea of conventionality of meaning 
in any great detail. So we are somewhat left wondering how we ought 
to understand his positive proposal. It seems certain, however, that he 
wants to say that the determination of meaning, which is governed by 
rules understood as conventions, is in some sense “up to us”, and defi-
nitely not fixed by the way the world happens to be independent of hu-
man interests, activities, practices, etc. But does Wittgenstein’s notion 
of conventionality exclude the determination of meaning by human na-
ture, or even the nature of the human mind? I shall return to this ques-
tion in section 5. Now I want to examine a more contemporary version 
of the idea that grammar is not answerable to what there is. 
3. Semantic Internalism
The main aim of this essay, as mentioned in the introduction, is to ar-
gue for a potentially interesting connection between Wittgenstein’s ar-
gument for the autonomy of grammar and some recent attempts to de-
fend the autonomy of semantics. However, the connection I want to 
5  ‘It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it)’ (Wittgenstein 
1974: 184)
6  “We said that by “meaning” we meant what an explanation of meaning explains. 
And an explanation of meaning is not an empirical proposition and not a causal 
explanation, but a rule, a convention” (Wittgenstein 1974: 68).
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establish between these two philosophical positions concerning the 
idea of autonomy applies only to a particular brand of internalism de-
fended by Chomsky (2000) and his supporters (e.g. Collins 2009, inter-
net; Pietroski 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006; McGilvray 1998) This internal-
ist position is known as the methodological internalism (MI). So, what is 
MI and how does it differ from other versions of internalist semantics?
MI is a fairly thin version of internalism: “a very modest, metaphysi-
cally light-weight doctrine, which neither denies any first-order meta-
physical claims nor introduces a new internalist metaphysics” (Collins, 
forthcoming). According to Collins, what characterises linguistic inter-
nalism is that “the explanations offered by successful linguistic theo-
ry neither presuppose nor entail externalia. There are externalia, but 
they do not enter into the explanations of linguistics qua externalia. 
Linguistics is methodologically solipsistic” (Collins, forthcoming). In 
contrast, semantic externalism is a heavy-duty metaphysical doctrine 
according to which semantic explanations essentially depend on the 
nature of external objects and their ontological status, and ought to re-
flect how things are anyway. Semantic externalism thus makes seman-
tics fundamentally intertwined with metaphysics. As any other version 
of internalism, MI takes linguistic meanings to be individuated inter-
nally rather than by reference to any external objects or properties that 
expressions are used to refer to. 
However, there are versions of semantic internalism that are metaphysi-
cally more substantial. An example is Jackendoff’s brand of internalism, 
which is, essentially, a form of idealism. Jackedoff (1983, 2002) main-
tains that the referents of words are internal, mental objects rather than 
external objects. In this way he simply exchanges one variant of the ref-
erentialist theory of meaning (with all its difficulties) for another. But 
a methodological brand of internalism, according to its advocates, has 
no such commitments; the methodological internalist “is someone 
who rejects the entwinement of semantics with general metaphysical 
doctrines, including idealist ones” (Collins, forthcoming). The meth-
odological internalist, unlike an idealist, doesn’t deny the existence of 
 externalia, or that we refer to externalia when we communicate. 
According to methodological internalists, the theory of meaning is not 
a theory of reference and truth; the latter phenomena are not, strictly 
speaking, semantic and are not scientifically intractable. As Pietroski 
writes,
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Sentences, as products of (largely innate and modular) language sys-
tems, have truth-conditions only by virtue of their relation to other 
cognitive systems and the environments in which the sentences are 
used. But sentences have their meanings by virtue of more local facts 
concerning the psychology (and hence biology) of language-users. 
So a semantics that makes the right theoretical cuts will not itself 
 associate sentences with truth-conditions. (Pietroski 2003a: 218)
On this view, semantic features, which are systematically tractable, su-
pervene on syntax, which is to say that semantics is basically a species 
of syntax.7 The kinds of semantic facts that for internalist semanticists 
stand in need of explanation are, for instance, structural effects on in-
terpretation brought about by the meanings of lexical items8, other in-
terpretive effects recorded in alternations9, certain structurally based 
semantic entailments10, structural non-ambiguities11, etc. 
7  But, as Chomsky explains, there is an important difference between this concep-
tion of semantics and what is typically considered by this name. He writes, “Virtually 
all work in syntax in the narrower sense has been intimately related to questions of 
semantic (and of course phonetic) interpretation, and motivated by such questions. 
The fact has often been misunderstood because many researchers have chosen to 
call this work “syntax,” reserving the term “semantics” for relations of expressions 
to something extra-linguistic. (Chomsky 2000: 174). As suggested here, for a MI like 
Chomsky, semantics is importantly linked to the study of syntax rather than to the 
study of the nature of extra-linguistic things.
8  The parade case is the contrast between eager and easy in the following construc-
tions:
(i) John is eager to please
(ii) John is easy to please
(iii) It is easy to please John
(iv)  *It is eager to please John (on the intended interpretation; i.e. with pleonas-
tic ‘it’) 
In (i) John is understood as the subject of eager, whilst in (ii), it is the object of easy. 
This structural difference is confirmed by the fact that (ii) has a paraphrase formu-
lated in (iii), whilst (i) cannot be paraphrased as (iv) (here ‘it’ must be construed as 
a referring expression rather than an expletive in order to preserve interpretability). 
See Chomsky 2000, Pietroski 2006, Collins 2012
9  The parade case is the contrast between ergative and non-ergative verbs as re-
gards the THEME argument alternation:
(v) Bill broke the bed
(vi) The bed broke
(vii) Bill made the bed
(viii) *The bed made
So whereas ergative verbs admit of alternation of their THEME argument, non-er-
gative verbs don’t, this being a result of their inherent lexical structure (see Levin 
1993, Collins 2011).
10  Certain structurally founded relations of entailment are considered to be part 
and parcel of an internalist semantic inquiry. Some examples in the literature are 
relations between chase and follow, persuade and intend (Chomsky 2000), kill and 
cause to die (Pietroski 2003b). 
11  Pietroski (2005, 2006) calls attention to ‘negative facts’ (e.g. non-ambiguity) 
about the interpretability of certain constructions that stand in need of explanation:
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There are some classic examples that internalists use in support of 
their claim that semantics explanations are not answerable to the na-
ture of external, mind-independent things. Chomsky, for instance, asks 
whether we must assume that there is a unique kind of object (or set of 
objects) in the world that the word London or book refers to in the fol-
lowing examples: 
(1) a. The book weighs five pounds
 b. He wrote a book
 c. He wrote a book and it weighs five pounds
 d. London is polluted 
 e. London has a population of 8 million people
 f. London is polluted and it has a population of 8 million people
We refer to objects such as books from various perspectives: as concrete 
objects, from an abstract perspective, or from both perspectives simul-
taneously (cf. Chomsky 2000: 21). Similarly, London can be spoken of in 
different ways: as a given portion of the atmosphere, as a population, or 
as both. However, none of this warrants any ontological commitment to 
the existence of a particular object, corresponding to the name London 
that possesses all these properties at once.
Collins (forthcoming) calls attention to some cases of inter-sentential co-
reference, which he also considers problematic for semantic externalists. 
(2) a.  [Barack Obama]i has been damaged by the health care issue, 
but hei remains likely to achieve a second term.
 b.  [The average American]i is optimistic no matter the setbacks 
hei faces.
As Collins explains, the coherence of intra-sentential co-reference in 
the examples of (2) remains invariant even though the way that Barack 
Obama denotes seems radically different from the way that the average 
American denotes. 
Another kind of cases that can’t be successfully explained within a 
standard externalist framework concerns the interpretation of generics. 
Consider the following sentences:
(ix) The millionaire called the senator from Texas
(x) The millionaire called the senator, and the senator is from Texas
(xi) The millionaire called the senator, and the call was from Texas
(xii) #The millionaire called the senator, and the millionaire is from Texas
Clearly (ix) is ambiguous and can be interpreted either as (x) or (xi) but not as (xii). 
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(3) a. Beavers are mammals
 b. Beavers build dams
As Pietroski (2006) notes, whereas (3a) requires that all beavers are 
mammals (3b) requires that only typical beavers build dams. External-
ist semantics that associates a standard semantic value with a lexical 
item beaver is unable to explain this contrast. 
Lastly, we might add to this list the cases of logical metonymy. Consider (4):
 (4) Bill enjoyed the book
We typically interpret (4) as meaning that Bill enjoyed some event that 
involves the book (some claim that this, by default, is the event of read-
ing the book). So, when combined with the verb enjoy, the noun book 
doesn’t have its typical denotation (an individual) but rather it denotes 
an event, or, more precisely, it has an ‘eventish’ construal. All these dif-
ferent examples are aimed at showing that subtle semantic differences 
that affect interpretation are not properly captured by a referentialist 
theory of meaning, which makes semantic explanations reliant on the 
nature of external objects and their ontological status.
Those who defend methodological internalism about natural language 
semantics are usually also committed to methodological naturalism 
and methodological individualism. This basically means that scientifi-
cally tractable semantic features are considered to be part and parcel of 
individual minds. Knowledge of language is individualistic and internal 
to the human mind/brain, and this ‘I-language’ is treated as a proper 
subject for a scientific study of natural languages. As Chomsky argues, 
it is naturalistic inquiry of the human mind in particular that imposes 
internalist, individualist limits: “if we are interested in accounting for 
what people do, and why, insofar as that is possible through naturalis-
tic inquiry, the argument for keeping to these limits seems persuasive” 
(Chomsky 2000: 32). On the first blush, this particular aspect of MI is 
in a strong disagreement with the spirit of Wittgenstein’s later philos-
ophy. Still, although Wittgenstein is deeply skeptical of the science of 
meaning, Chomsky, in fact, shares his skepticism. In other words, Witt-
genstein and Chomsky have a common enemy: the referentialist theory 
of meaning. The latter represents an attempt to systematically explain 
meaning by means of the objects referred to, and to reduce semantic 
explanation to the procedure of assigning standard semantic values to 
linguistic expressions. 
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4. Wittgenstein’s anti-referentialism and 
the use-conception of meaning
It is notable that Chomsky explicitly mentions Wittgenstein and Turing 
as key forerunners to anti-externalism (cf. Chomsky 2000: 44-45). In his 
opinion, Wittgenstein (like Turing) “does not adopt the standard exter-
nalist account”, and indeed, an “internalist perspective… seems suitable 
to [his] intuitions” (ibid.). What brings Chomsky to view the later Witt-
genstein as a latent internalist?
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein appears highly critical of 
attempts to conceive of a word’s meaning in terms of objects, proper-
ties, relations, or processes referred to via uses of that word. The open-
ing discussion in Philosophical Investigations is set against “a particu-
lar picture of the essence of human language” according to which a 
word’s meaning is the object for which the word stands (Wittgenstein 
1953: §1). On this picture of linguistic meaning, naming worldly ob-
jects,  activities, processes, etc. is “the foundation, the be all and end 
all of language” (Wittgenstein 1974: 56). One reason the semanticists, 
Wittgenstein maintains, think of words as labels for ‘things’ is that they 
are inclined to take common nouns and proper names as paradigmat-
ic  examples of linguistic items: one is “thinking primarily of nouns like 
“table”, “chair”, “bread”, and of people’s names, and only secondarily of 
the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds 
of word as something that will take care of itself” (ibid.). 
The referentialist picture of meaning, Wittgenstein argues, oversimpli-
fies the ways we use language, and can lead to serious distortions of our 
ordinary notion of names and their meaning. The paramount example 
of how adherence to referentialism can create such distortions comes 
from Russell’s theory of logically proper names, where a set of puta-
tively legitimate requirements stemming from the referentialist frame-
work led to the view that only demonstratives qualify as ‘real’ names. 
Wittgenstein rejects this conclusion, arguing that it should lead us to 
question referentialist assumptions and seek alternatives to the view 
that the meaning of a name is its bearer (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §40). 
To facilitate this, his later work illustrates how our understanding of 
the meanings of words is at least partially revealed in our ability to put 
those words to different uses on different occasions – a thought sum-
marised in the slogan ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ 
(Wittgenstein 1953: §43). 
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Wittgenstein’s use-based conception of meaning emerged in the early 
1930s in the context of discussions concerning the foundations of math-
ematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with the formalists that mathematics 
is merely about signs, but he also disagrees with Frege who thinks that 
there must be something corresponding with the mere signs which 
gives them meaning:
Frege was right in objecting to the conception that the numbers of 
arithmetic are signs. The sign ‘0’, after all, does not have the prop-
erty of yielding the sign ‘1’ when it is added to the sign ‘1’. Frege was 
right in this criticism. Only he did not see the other, justified side of 
formalism, that the symbols of mathematics, although they are not 
signs, lack a meaning. For Frege the alternative was this: either we 
deal with strokes of ink on paper or these strokes of ink are signs of 
something and their meaning is what they go proxy for. The game 
of chess itself shows that these alternatives are wrongly conceived-
-although it is not the wooden chessmen we are dealing with, these 
figures do not go proxy for anything, they have no meaning in Frege’s 
sense. There is still a third possibility, the signs can be used the way 
they are in the game. (Wittgenstein 1979: 105)
The central idea in this early version of the theory is that rules regulat-
ing the employment of expressions in sentential and extra-sentential 
contexts determine their meaning. As we saw earlier, according to the 
autonomy thesis, these rules are not answerable to the nature of things. 
Pace Frege there need be nothing to which expressions correspond that 
gives them meaning, if they have a use. If we compare language and its 
use to a game like chess it is clear that the rules that govern the possi-
ble moves of particular pieces constitute their role, and not some object 
they go proxy for. The actual playing of a game on a particular occasion 
(namely, an act of communication by means of language) represents an 
implementation of what is set forth in the rules for that game. Noth-
ing external to a sign is responsible for its having a particular meaning.
In Philosophical Investigations a more mature version of the use con-
ception of meaning is demonstrated in a number of examples, the key 
point being that our language is analogous to a toolbox with different 
types of tools that serve different functions and have different possi-
bilities of use. “The functions of words”, Wittgenstein stresses, “are as 
diverse as the functions of [tools]” (Wittgenstein 1953: §11). Words fall 
into different classes or parts of speech in accordance with the kind of 
function they serve; there are number-words that generally serve (are 
used for) for counting and calculating, colour-words that serve for dis-
tinguishing objects based on their colour, common nouns that serve 
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for distinguishing and grouping objects based on their generic type, 
and so on.
To sum up then, on adopting a use-based conception of meaning, we 
come to the view that to understand the meaning of an expression is 
just to understand how that expression might be employed in senten-
tial and extra-sentential contexts. This marks a significant departure 
from the view that the meaning of an expression is some extra-linguis-
tic (mental or physical) entity that somehow corresponds to that ex-
pression.12 Both Wittgenstein and MI are in favour of characterising the 
semantics of expressions in terms of their employment (broadly con-
strued) and they are equally opposed to views that characterise mean-
ing in terms of reference. But is this enough to establish the connec-
tion between these two positions? Doesn’t Wittgenstein have qualms 
regarding the mentalist construal of meaning? And doesn’t he think 
that meaning is conventional and arbitrary? In the next two sections I 
turn to these concerns. 
5. Reinforcing the connection: arbitrariness, 
conventionality and human nature
I have argued that there seems to be an interesting connection between 
Wittgenstein’s argument for the autonomy of grammar – in particular, 
its critical part – and several arguments for the independence of seman-
tics from ontology recently put forward by semantic internalists. But 
we have also seen that, for semantic internalists, all semantic facts, al-
though not derivable from, or answerable to, the external world, are still 
a product of the human mind, and are, to that extent, certainly not ar-
bitrary. So, there seems to be an unquestionable conflict between Witt-
genstein’s and the internalist’s response to the autonomy argument. I 
am ready to concede that a gap between these two positions cannot ever 
be fully closed; however, I want to give a few reasons in favour of reduc-
ing the gap. In this section I examine a few potential problems that are 
directly related to the autonomy thesis and in the next section two more 
general problems are considered. 
12  It is crucial that the methodological internalist doesn’t subscribe to a mentalist 
variant of referentialism, which is what distinguishes this view from that of Katz 
and Fodor’s (1963), Lakoff’s (1970, 1987), or Jackendoff’s (1997, 2002). As Pietroski 
stresses, the MI proposal is not that “linguistic expressions have Bedeutungen that 
are mental as opposed to environmental” (Pietroski 2005: 270). A similar point is 
argued for in McGilvray (1999: 164ff.). I shall discuss this objection to MI in more 
detail below. 
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(i) Wittgenstein’s idea of arbitrariness 
of grammar as merely negative 
Wittgenstein calls grammatical rules arbitrary and this qualification 
seems to imply that they are dispensable, alterable, or a matter of choice 
or decision. However, Wittgenstein’s notion of arbitrariness is purely 
negative and, therefore, very thin. So, to say that a rule of grammar is 
arbitrary is merely to say that it cannot be justified by reference to the 
nature of external objects: “the saying that the rules of grammar are ar-
bitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification, which is 
constructed on the model of justifying a sentence by pointing to what 
verifies it” (Wittgenstein 1967: 331). With such a thin notion of arbitrari-
ness Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar is definitely not up against 
the idea that the meaning and use of words is constrained in a way that 
is not easily alterable by an individual or social decision, and, to that ex-
tent, he is on the side of semantic internalists. Furthermore, in his ma-
ture work (Zettel, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology) he holds 
that grammar is equally akin to what is arbitrary and what is non-arbi-
trary (Wittgenstein 1967: 358), and that grammatical systems, such as 
the semantics of colours or numbers, “may ‘reside in our nature’ but cer-
tainly not in the nature of things (Wittgenstein 1967: 357)”. 
(ii) Conventionality, choice and human nature
I finished off section 3 by asking the question: does Wittgenstein’s no-
tion of conventionality exclude the determination of meaning by hu-
man nature, or the nature of human mind? Insofar as conventionality 
may imply some degree of choice then the answer should be affirmative 
since the facts of nature cannot be easily tampered with. Certainly, Witt-
genstein sometimes compares the arbitrariness of grammatical rules to 
the arbitrariness of the choice of the unit of measurement.13 I can choose 
to measure the length of a table in centimetres or in inches.14 But who 
chooses grammatical rules? And how? Can they be changed? Are there 
some constrains on which grammatical rules we could choose to follow? 
I noted earlier that Wittgenstein maintains that the rules cannot sim-
ply be altered or substituted. To be sure, one could attempt to change 
13  He writes, “the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of 
a unit of measurement” (Wittgenstein 1974: 184).
14  We should bear in mind that the choice of measurement is constrained by vari-
ous practical considerations. It wouldn’t be at all practical to measure the length of a 
shelf in light-years, for instance. 
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a convention but this, Wittgenstein argues, would not be sufficient for 
changing the use of a word, hence, also its meaning: 
[…] If what gives a proposition sense is its agreement with grammat-
ical rules then let’s make just this rule, to permit the sentence “red 
and green are both at this point at the same time”. Very well; but that 
doesn’t fix the grammar of the expression. Further stipulations have 
yet to be made about how such a sentence is to be used; e.g. how it is 
to be verified (Wittgenstein 1974: 127). 
So, even though grammatical rules qua conventions are said to deter-
mine use, any modification of grammatical rules seems to be impor-
tantly constrained by the history of current use. But is this particular 
history of use just a matter of our habituation? Wittgenstein’s answer 
here is ‘no’. In fact, in his more mature work Wittgenstein’s commit-
ment to the idea of arbitrariness of grammar is even more diluted. Now 
he is prepared to admit the possibility that our colour grammar, for in-
stance, could even have a physical substrate, and, furthermore, the way 
we use colour words or number words is not merely a matter of our ha-
bituation to the current colour or number concepts: 
But doesn’t anything physical correspond to [the gap between red and 
green]? I do not deny that. (And suppose it were merely our habitu-
ation to these concepts, to these language-games? But I am not say-
ing that it is so.) (Wittgenstein 1980: 424.) [Wittgenstein 1967: 355.]
It bears emphasis that, in his mature works, Wittgenstein’s view vis-
à-vis grammar does not relapse into referentialism: not for a moment 
would he accept the view that grammar is after all answerable to the na-
ture of the objects referred to by words. As he stresses, “[we] have a col-
our system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in our 
nature or in the nature of things? […] Not in the nature of numbers or 
colours” (Wittgenstein 1967: 357). So semantic externalism is definitely 
ruled out. But what we witness now is a reluctance to call grammar ar-
bitrary: insofar as grammar may ‘reside in our nature’, it is akin both to 
what is arbitrary and to what is not arbitrary (Wittgenstein 1967: 358). 
That is, the grammar of some concepts (colours, numbers) seems to be 
more hard-wired and thus more resistant to a change by stipulation, 
whilst the grammar of other concepts (e.g. technical terms) seems to be 
more arbitrary, flexible and open to modification. Or, more precisely, 
some aspects of meaning are arbitrary and open to fluctuation whilst 
some are fixed and constant. 
The reference to ‘our nature’ as opposed to the nature of external ob-
jects, and the radical dilution of the arbitrariness thesis, brings the 
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mature Wittgenstein’s views on grammar even closer to contempo-
rary semantic internalists. However, an important caveat is in order: al-
though both positions are in some sense naturalist, for Wittgenstein, 
human nature, which gives rise to the systematicity that characterises 
language use, is to a critical degree nurtured; in other words, it repre-
sents a result of training and experience: 
If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of 
examples,--that he then proceeds like this and not like that in a par-
ticular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this 
and not that is the ‘natural’ continuation for him: this of itself is an 
extremely important fact of nature. (Wittgenstein 1980: 424) 
Semantic internalists are devoted rationalists, and when they say that 
semantics is answerable to human nature and to facts that are internal 
to the human mind, this certainly doesn’t mean that they originate in 
learning and experience, but are part and parcel of an innate biological 
endowment of human beings. So where Wittgenstein would focus on 
learning and training as a source of natural tendencies of human be-
ings, that is, those that are manifested in language use, an internalist 
would tend to emphasise human innate capacities.15 
6. Are Wittgenstein’s contextualism and anti-mentalism 
fatal for establishing the connection with internalism?
The final two points I want to make concern two additional worries that 
arise in connection with an attempt to associate the later Wittgenstein 
with semantic internalism. The first obvious problem is Wittgenstein’s 
widespread anti-mentalism, and the second is the special significance for 
interpretation he assigns to contexts of use. I take these points in turn. 
In The Blue and Brown Books, Philosophical Investigations, and other 
later writings Wittgenstein argues against postulating hidden psycho-
logical mechanisms and processes as a method of explaining what we 
mean by the words we use. The picture Wittgenstein tries to eschew is 
one in which the act of using expressions must be accompanied by hid-
den mental processes or images that give those expressions the mean-
ings they have. Wittgenstein argues that use itself should be enough to 
explain their meaning or significance. As he notes:
15  However, Wittgenstein’s scepticism about learning language (in particular, what 
individual words mean) by ostensive methods (PI 28-31) could be construed as some 
sort of the poverty of stimulus argument, which would then lend support to the in-
nateness thesis, but this possibility can’t be explored here. 
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The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are 
looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an 
object co-existing with the sign… [One] is tempted to imagine that 
which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, ac-
companying the sentence. (Wittgenstein 1958: 5)
One might rightly see a semantic internalist as succumbing to exact-
ly this temptation. However, it should be clear by now that the matter 
is not all that simple. Wittgenstein’s target here seems to be a particu-
lar version of the psychological conception of meaning where words go 
proxy for internal, mental referents (‘the objects co-existing with the 
sign’) that are their meanings. However, we have seen earlier that, in 
contrast to metaphysical internalists, methodological internalists, to 
whose views Wittgenstein’s autonomy thesis was compared in this es-
say, do not defend this sort of naïve, mentalist referentialism where the 
only significant difference with the standard, externalist referential-
ism is replacing environmental Bedeutungen with their supposed men-
tal counterparts (see Pietroski 2005: 270). Methodological internalists, 
like Wittgenstein, understand linguistic meaning as the potential to 
use an expression in a certain (linguistic) context (i.e. its syntactic em-
ployment) rather than something that corresponds to the expression. 
So, Wittgenstein’s opposition to internalism is restricted to a particular 
kind of mentalist or internalist referentialism, which inherits the simi-
lar difficulties as the externalist referentialism. Furthermore, as empha-
sised in the Blue Book, Wittgenstein has nothing against the attempts to 
scientifically explain certain aspects of language, and, moreover, noth-
ing against a psychological explanation of certain aspects of the mind, 
where the internal basis for language use might be located. But, as he 
clearly states, “this aspect of the mind does not interest us. The prob-
lems which it may set are psychological problems, and the method of 
their solution is that of natural science” (Wittgenstein 1958: 6).
The second worry stems from Wittgenstein’s endorsement of radical 
contextualism. Wittgenstein maintains that “[one knows] what a word 
means in certain contexts” (Wittgenstein 1958: 9). Some authors, how-
ever, take for granted that contextualism inevitably supports semantic 
externalism. Namely, they assume that insofar as the facts about particu-
lar contexts of language use play a role in the determination of meaning, 
meaning is therefore determined by the facts that are external to an indi-
vidual mind/brain.16 There are three possible responses to this objection. 
16  Child (2010) defends this view. 
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First, there is a widespread confusion about what ‘internalism’ means. 
So it is common to run internalism about the linguistic meaning and in-
ternalism about mental content together. However, these two positions 
are importantly different in that former is restricted to the language fac-
ulty whilst the latter concerns the whole of mental operations. Thus, it 
is possible to be an internalist about linguistic meaning (LMI) and an 
externalist about mental content (MCE) (see Pietroski 2006), or both 
an LMI and a mental content internalist (MCI). One could therefore 
argue that Wittgenstein’s contextualism is compatible with LMI even 
though he is an externalist about the mental content. 
Second, an internalist (MCI) might argue that there is an important dif-
ference between a constitutive and epistemic (diagnostic) role of con-
text; on this view, context plays an important epistemic role for an in-
terpreter who needs to identify the thought expressed by an utterance; 
context, however, has no constitutive role in determining the semantics 
of the speaker’s utterance, which is achieved completely internally. So, 
when Wittgenstein speaks about knowing what a word means in a cer-
tain context (as per the above quotation) what he has in mind is the in-
terpreter’s perspective and the epistemological role of context. 
Third, an internalist (MCI) might argue that insofar as the knowledge 
and beliefs about context are formally represented in the mind, they 
are also internally individuated. These formal internal mental/compu-
tational structures will not strictly ‘mean’ anything external like ‘shared 
social practices’ (except by stipulation or for explanatory purposes) for 
the reasons inherent in the MC internalism – these (and all mental 
states) are not individuated in relation to the world in virtue of being, 
by hypothesis, computations. An internalist can tell a causal story up to 
a point as to how the particular formal states in the mind were formed, 
but she can’t claim any external content for such states. Wittgenstein’s 
contextualism, on this account, would be strictly speaking orthogonal 
to the issues concerning the individuation of mental states.
7. Conclusion 
In this paper I argued for a particular connection between Wittgen-
stein’s views regarding the autonomy of grammar and some more con-
temporary attempts to distinguish the study of meaning from consid-
erations concerning the ontological status of external objects. It should 
be emphasised, however, that I do not intend to claim that this itself is 
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sufficient to prove that Wittgenstein is an internalist. My argument cer-
tainly does not rule out other possible areas of disagreement and here I 
want to briefly mention what I think these are.
First, the most prominent point of contrast between Wittgenstein and 
semantic internalist lies in their radically different conceptions of lan-
guage. An essential mark of Chomsky’s ‘cognitive turn’ in linguistics is 
his novel conception of language as an internal, psychological state of 
an individual human organism. Language, in other words, is a psycho-
logical (biological) phenomenon, which we can put to use in various ac-
tivities: “a mental reality underlying actual behaviour” (Chomsky 1965: 
3). What we learn by observing the use of language in the context of ac-
tivities represents a source of evidence for what makes such use possible 
(i.e. grammatical competence). For Wittgenstein, by contrast, an essen-
tial thing about language is precisely that it is woven with activities and 
practices, and its communal, practical nature, the fact that it is usable 
and used. There is, moreover, nothing further that matters about lan-
guage apart from what one might observe by studying different social 
practices and adopted techniques (i.e. language use). From that point 
of view, the theorist’s appeals to individual psychologies as a way to ex-
plain meaning is seen as a kind of explanation that is not strictly speak-
ing linguistic, since it appeals to entities and processes that are out-
side the domain of language. For Chomsky, however, individual mental 
states are exactly what counts as the proper domain of linguistics. 
Another area of disagreement worth highlighting concerns language 
acquisition. As noted above, Chomsky’s generative linguistics is a spe-
cies of the rationalist theory of knowledge whereby vital linguistic 
structures are considered innate. The role of experience is to stimulate 
the acquisition of linguistic knowledge, rather than representing the 
main source or origin of linguistic knowledge. The main motivation for 
the nativist view comes from ‘the poverty of stimulus argument’, which 
trades on the fact that a child typically acquires language in certain min-
imal environmental conditions, whereas a non-human animal doesn’t. 
On this view, the difference between us and other animals is due to the 
fact that the child possesses a certain biological property that the ani-
mal lacks. Given that they focus on a radically different conception of 
language, Wittgenstein’s views often seem to be geared towards some 
form of empiricism rather than rationalism.17 Hence, not infrequent-
17  See Chomsky (1969) for a critique of Wittgenstein’s empiricist leanings in the 
discussion of language learning. 
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ly, he talks about language learning in terms of training or drilling, as 
one trains an animal to react to certain stimuli. On Wittgenstein’s view, 
a child acquires a language in the context of getting initiated into eve-
ryday practices (language games), and in the course of mastering tech-
niques of using signs within those practices. This process is essentially 
normative in that there are correct and incorrect reactions to certain 
prompts in teaching; a child normally learns to do things by using lan-
guage ‘as we do’ and it ‘comes naturally’ to the child to react to cer-
tain tasks as the rest of us do. Although Wittgenstein undoubtedly takes 
teaching and initiation into practices to be the key aspect of a child’s 
acquiring a language, he also seems to be aware that there is perhaps 
more to this process than what the child may receive in the form of in-
structions by adults. This additional component he calls ‘the (very gen-
eral) facts of nature’18, however, the strictly conceptual character of his 
philosophical project simply rules out any further interest in such facts. 
This is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the potential contrasts 
between the two positions but merely an illustration of the most obvi-
ous differences that might give us a good reason to pause before we de-
cide that Wittgenstein could be a semantic internalist. However, I hope 
to have shown that in spite of such contrasts, there is a great deal that 
unites these positions. In particular, both reject the prevailing external-
ist view that to investigate a language is just to investigate those relations 
that supposedly hold between linguistic expressions and the extra-lin-
guistic world. Accordingly, there is no need to look to such relations as 
constitutive of our notions of grammar and linguistic meaning.19 
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Tamara Dobler
Autonomija gramatike i semantički internalizam
Apstrakt
U svojim radovima o prirodnoj upotrebi jezika nakon Tractatusa Vitgen-
štajn je branio pojam autonomije gramatike, kako ga je nazivao. Prema 
ovom mišljenju, gramatika – ili semantika, prema recentnijem idiomu – 
suštinski je autonomna u odnosu na metafizička razmatranja i nije saobra-
zna prirodi stvari. Ovaj argument je imao nekoliko srodnih otelovljenja u 
Vitgenštajnovim radovima nakon Tractatusa i doveo je do pojave brojnih 
važnih uvida, kako kritičkih, tako i konstruktivnih. U ovom radu zastupa-
ću stav o potencijalnoj vezi između Vitgenštajnovog argumenta autonomije 
i nešto recentnijih internalističkih argumenata za autonomiju semantike. 
Moj glavni podstrek za uspostavljanje ove veze potiče iz činjenice da su ko-
mentari kasnijeg Vitgeštajna o gramatici i značenju protivstavljeni određe-
nim središnjim postavkama semantičkog eksternalizma.
Ključne reči: Vitgenštajn, gramatika, autonomija, arbitrarnost, značenje kao 
upotreba, semantički internalizam i eksternalizam, referencija, mentalizam.
